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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study is to research the relation between executive compensation and 
firm performance, as well as the significance of equal pay within the executive team. As 
well as total CEO compensation, the paper uses a measure known as CEO Pay Slice, which 
is the fraction of compensation that the CEO receives out of total pay to other executives. 
Executive compensation and firm performance is widely studied, but there is little research 
employing data from the Nordic countries. Previous studies have examined CPS either on 
data from the U.S. or the UK. This study uses data from Finnish listed firms to research the 
effectiveness of executive compensation strategies, and examine the compensation culture 
in Finland and Nordic countries. The data set consist of all non-financial firms listed in the 
OMX Helsinki stock exchange from 2010 to 2017. 
The main performance measures in the regressions are industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q for 
firm value, and industry-adjusted ROA for accounting profitability. Main findings are that 
CEO compensation has a significant positive association with future firm value. This 
suggests that Finnish CEOs are able to increase firm value in accordance with their 
compensation level. The correlation with accounting profitability is positive but not 
significant. Compensation differences within executives seem to have no effect on firm 
value or accounting profitability. These findings provide useful reference for future 
research on executive compensation, particularly on the Nordic countries. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: executive compensation, ceo pay slice, corporate governance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Each year, most major news outlets in Finland report the annual income of the people, who 
earned the most. In that list are a number of Finnish companies‟ executives. The level of 
pay of some companies leads to discussion and scrutiny of executive remuneration. Mostly 
people are concerned that the compensation is too great in comparison to the 
responsibilities and their added value to a firm. The discussion on executive compensation 
is understandable, given the fact that executive pay has been increasing substantially over 
time (Bebchuk & Grinstein 2005; Forbes, Pogue & Hodgkinson 2016). 
Executives are paid relatively high compensation mainly for three reasons. Their salary is a 
compensation for knowledge and expertise in the area, a recognition for their past 
performance and investment in the company, and an incentive to carry on the exemplary 
performance in the future. 
Due to the controversy surrounding the level of pay of executives, the topic has been 
widely discussed and studied. The most interesting topic for researchers seems to be the 
association between executive compensation and firm performance (e.g. Mehran 1995, Tao 
2010, Gigliotti 2013). Generally a proportion of the total compensation to an executive is 
based on personal or company performance, so one would assume the level of 
compensation to be somewhat positively correlated with the most widely used measures of 
firm performance. However, there is no consensus on the level and structure of executive 
pay that would be the most beneficial for the company. It seems to depend on firm 
characteristics, industry, culture, and many other factors. The mixed results from previous 
research could also be due to the complexity of business organizations, varying measures 
of firm performance or the difficulties associated with modeling firm-value-maximization 
incentives. 
Instead on emphasizing the total level of executive pay to study its relation to firm 
performance, Bebchuk, Cremers & Peyer (2011) introduced a new variable to research this 
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relationship, CEO pay slice. CEO pay slice (CPS) is the fraction of pay that the CEO 
receives out of total pay to top five executives. This variable has been used to study CEO 
dominance, CEO risk taking, pay inequality, and firm value. However, the initial use for 
CPS by Bebchuk et al. (2011) was to determine the capability of a „superstar‟ CEO in 
running the firm and bringing added value to the firm. The main research question being: 
does paying more to the CEO compared to the other top executives increase firm value and 
accounting performance. 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
This study is closely related to the fundamentals of agency theory. The principal-agent 
issue states that executives have no reason to automatically align their personal interest 
with outside investors‟ financial objectives. The problem is to get all the shareholders‟ 
agents, including top executives, managers and employees, working together to maximize 
firm value. Corporations deal with this issue through incentives and monitoring. Incentives 
make sure that executives are rewarded appropriately when they add value to the firm, 
while monitoring ensures that the right people get rewarded the right amount for their 
performance. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 290.) 
It is generally assumed that CEO characteristics affect organizational performance. 
Talented CEOs have superior ability to process economics information and make value-
added decisions for shareholders. CEOs are compensated for their abilities with higher 
remunerations. However, it can be argued that talented CEOs are generally over-valued 
regarding their skill set and added value they bring to the firm. Therefore, research on the 
executive compensation is important to understand the determinants and effect of CEO 
compensation and improve the compensation practices. 
Differing compensation structures within the top executive team can create its own issues. 
A significant difference between the CEOs and the executive teams pay can affect firm 
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performance in a negative way if the rest of the executive team feel like their efforts are 
not appreciated enough or the CEO fails to provide the expected performance. 
The purpose of the study is to further research the association between executive 
compensation and firm performance, as well as the significance of equal pay between 
executives. In particular, the study examines the characteristics of the top executive team 
measured by their valuation and its effect on firm value and accounting profitability. 
Previous studies have examined this relation either on data from the U.S. or the UK (e.g. 
Bebchuk et al. 2011, Tarkovska 2017). This study intends on using data from Finnish listed 
firms to research the effectiveness of executive compensation structure, and examine the 
compensation culture in Finland and Nordic countries in general. 
 
1.2. Hypotheses 
This thesis examines the effect of executive compensation on firm performance by two 
measures: total CEO compensation and CPS. The first part of the study examines the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm operational performance and valuation. 
The null hypothesis for this part of the study assumes no significant relationship between 
the factors, implying that compensation level has no effect on performance. 
H0: CEO compensation does not affect firm performance 
The alternative hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship between CEO total 
compensation and firm performance. As compensation is generally linked to the amount of 
work, required level of expertise, or performance, it can be assumed that CEO 
compensation level and firm performance have a positive correlation. This suggests that an 
increase in total CEO compensation would result in a positive change in firm value and 
accounting profitability.  
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 H1: CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance 
According to this hypothesis, Finnish CEOs have exceptional skills and knowledge to offer 
the company, and thus are paid relatively high. This is then reflected onto the firm, 
increasing its operational performance and value.  
Bebchuk et al. (2011) presented in their study the optimal selection hypothesis, which 
assumes that no firm would be able to increase its value by changing its CPS level. 
However, CPS levels could relate to firm value to the extent that the optimal CPS level 
differs across firms. 
The optimal CPS level for any given firm depends on four considerations: 
1. The pool of candidates from which the members of the top executive team are 
drawn, and the quality and outside opportunities of these candidates clearly differ 
from firm to firm 
2. The extent to which it is desirable to provide tournament incentives to top 
executives other than the CEO 
3. The extent to which it is desirable for the firm to have a dominant player model 
based on one especially important player rather than a management model based on a 
team of top executives 
4. The optimal CPS level reflects whether it is desirable to concentrate dollars spent 
on incentive generation on the CEO instead on other top executives. 
Existing theory on the subject does not provide an unambiguous prediction as to how the 
above considerations relate to firm value. Derived from the optimal selection hypothesis 
are the research hypotheses for this part. 
H0: CPS does not affect firm performance 
The null hypothesis assumes no statistically significant relationship between CPS level and 
firm performance. Thus, pay inequality between executives does not affect firm value and 
accounting profitability.  
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H1: CPS is positively correlated with firm performance 
H2: CPS is negatively correlated with firm performance 
The first alternative hypothesis implies that CPS is positively correlated with firm 
valuation and performance, and having a CEO of high value increases firm performance. 
This suggests that it is beneficial for a Finnish firm to provide tournament incentives to the 
CEO, and having a dominant player model rather than a management model. 
The second hypothesis implies a negative association between CPS and performance. A 
high valued CEO or a high level of compensation for the CEO in proportion to the 
executive team does not increase firm performance or value. This hypothesis supports the 
management model based on a team of top executives rather than the dominant player 
model. 
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
The structure of the thesis is as following. In the second chapter, this paper presents the 
theoretical framework related to the research. This research is closely related to the aspects 
of agency theory and corporate governance, which are both examined in the second 
chapter. The following part discusses corporate governance and governing principles of a 
firm. Compensation strategy and its determinants are explained and discussed in the third 
sub chapter, the final part of the theoretical framework. In the third chapter, the paper 
presents previous research on the related topics. This chapter examines recent and 
significant research papers and interprets the results and main findings of the papers. 
The empirical part of this paper is presented in chapter‟s four to six. The fourth chapter 
shows the sources and data collection methodology as well as the descriptive statistics and 
cross correlations for the data. The fifth chapter demonstrates the calculations for the 
variables and methodology used in the regressions. In the next chapter, the results of the 
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regressions are presented and interpreted. The final chapter summarizes the results from 
the regressions and discusses the limitations and implications of this study.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Agency theory 
Agency theory is perhaps the most renowned and most used theory associated with the 
compensation-performance relationship, especially regarding executive compensation. It 
was first introduced by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 in their paper Theory of the firm. 
Agency theory has since been used by many respected and influential researchers as the 
basis for their studies on compensation (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Murphy 1990; 
Prendergast 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman & Dykes 2005; Cadsby, Song & Tapon 2007). 
Thus, agency theory seems to be especially well suited for studies concentrating on the 
relationship between compensation and performance. Additionally, agency theory is rather 
understandable and straight-forward and as such is widely favored in academic studies. 
Taking into consideration the recent criticism of agency theory (e.g. Donoher, Reed & 
Storrud-Barnes 2007), it is still a valid theory in studying and explaining executive 
compensation. 
Milton Friedman (2007) explained that a corporate executive is an employee of the owners 
of the business thus he has a direct responsibility to his employers. This means that 
executives have to conduct business in a way that the owners of the company want. 
Generally owners of the company want the business to be as valuable as possible. Creating 
value for the company and its owners means maximizing profit and the market value of the 
company while conforming to the basic rules of the society. 
According to Harris and Raviv (1979), executives will want their compensation structured 
so that they bear less personal risk. This implies that executives should prefer fixed cash 
compensation to equity-based compensation. Fixed cash compensation is constant and 
agreed upon signing the contract, while equity-based compensation is tied to the firm‟s 
stock return. The executive might think that equity pay is more volatile and is to some 
degree beyond his control. This preference is reinforced because the value of an 
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executive‟s human capital will also vary with the firm‟s stock performance (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Amihud & Lev 1981).  Executives might make more risk-averse decisions 
in operating the firm to reduce their compensation risk. This will reduce the firm‟s risk, but 
also impact the profits negatively. These activities conflict with the shareholders‟ interests 
creating a so called principal-agent issue. 
In principal-agent issue, the managers have no reason to automatically align their personal 
interest with outside investors‟ financial objectives. The problem is to get all the 
shareholders‟ agents, including top managers, middle managers and employees, working 
together to maximize value. Corporations deal with this issue through incentives and 
measuring performance. Incentives make sure that managers are rewarded appropriately 
when they add value to the firm, while performance measurement ensures that the right 
people get rewarded the right amount for their performance. (Brealey et al. 2011: 290.) 
Agency costs arise from the process that tries to alleviate the principal-agent issue in the 
company. Agency costs are an expense either the principal pays to the agent or uses for the 
monitoring of the agent. Monitoring is an effective way for a company to prevent the more 
obvious agency costs. Evaluating executives can determine if they are putting enough 
effort to their work. Despite monitoring requiring time and money, some amount of 
monitoring is always useful. However, monitoring follows the law of diminishing marginal 
utility in a way that at some point, price of extra monitoring doesn‟t reduce the agency 
costs. (Brealey et al. 2011: 292.) 
According to Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) reducing agency costs can be done 
through two different methods. The principal may monitor the agent either through 
purchasing information about the agents‟ efforts or linking incentives to the agents‟ 
outcomes. Since agency costs have been shown to be directly related to the cost of 
replacing executives (Jensen & Meckling 1976), replacing agents should be only the last 
option to reduce agency costs. 
Monitoring and incentive alignment might be relatively straight-forward methods to 
control agents, but they can also result in unwanted consequences. Agents are affected by 
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incentives, but not always in a beneficial way to the principal (Prendergast 1999). Yet it is 
not assumed in agency theory that agent is prone to opportunism, but that the agent has 
self-interest which can show in opportunism under certain conditions (Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2005). To avoid the opportunism of an agent, principals need to have the resources deemed 
necessary by the agent in developing and enacting strategy and operations within the firm. 
The necessary resources will give principals the leverage they need to influence the agent 
in aligning their interests. (Perkins 2008.) 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), in situations with difficult contradicting problems where 
opportunism by the agent is likely, agency theory is most relevant. A good example of this 
is the relationship between shareholder and executive, and their conflict of interest in 
running the firm. 
Intensive monitoring or relying solely on monitoring can also have some unwanted 
consequences. Too much monitoring is said to hinder the alignment of agents and 
principals interests, resulting in diminishing returns from monitoring. (Tosi & Gomez-
Mejia 1994.) 
Agency theory can be used in examining CEO and executive compensation in general. 
According to Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994), agency theory can explain the logic of 
executive compensation. Equity holders (principals) delegate the responsibility of 
managing the company to the CEO or executive (agent), but control problem arises 
because of the differing interests between them. The executive may use the position given 
to pursue own objectives, which the principal tries to prevent by developing a monitoring 
system to inhibit the agent‟s actions. The monitoring primarily occurs through using fixed 
and contingent incentive in order to align the interests of the executive and shareholders. 
Fixed compensation is used to reduce opportunism in the short-term in that an executive 
will get fired and not get paid this fixed compensation if he doesn‟t act according to the 
shareholders‟ guidelines, whilst contingent compensation reduces opportunism in the long-
term as it forces the executive to make effort in fulfilling the long-term goals of the 
shareholders in order to receive this contingent compensation. 
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Agency theory suggests that market forces should determine the level of executive 
compensation, since the shareholders (principals) value market performance it seems 
logical to reward agents according to market performance. However, Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia (1989) point out that markets fail to set the compensation level and discipline 
executives in larger firms, because the assumptions underlying the theory of effective 
market control of managerial behavior is very stringent and seldom met and because the 
actual control of large firms is not with the shareholders, but with the executives whose 
interests aren‟t aligned with the owners. This imperfection of market forces in larger firms 
can be overcome by using agency contracts. 
The purpose of an agency contract is to align the interests of owners and executives. By 
linking executives‟ compensation on profits and stock price, the executive has an incentive 
to make decisions beneficial to the owners. In addition, according to Eisenhardt (1989: 65), 
outcome uncertainty coupled with differences in level of risk borne should influence 
contracts between principal and agent. 
In the presence of an agency contract linking executive compensation and firm 
performance, one could assume that agency problems would be eliminated. However, this 
is not always the case. Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) studied various empirical 
studies of the executive compensation sensitivity to firm performance of agency contracts. 
All of these studies were conducted under the assumption that optimal contracts should 
result in strong compensation-performance sensitivity. However, there was no strong 
empirical link between compensation-performance sensitivity in these contracts. 
Due to indecisive results of using agency contracts to control agents, other methods need to 
be considered as well. Agency contracts seem to be more incentive driven rather than 
focused on behavioral monitoring. In fact, when comparing agency-based compensation on 
using only performance-based incentives and behavioral monitoring, it might actually be 
possible to utilize complementarities of both perspectives (Makri, Lane & Gomez-Mejia 
2006). The idea behind this is that some of these methods would work in a way that 
executive compensation would have some kind of effect on future firm performance. 
Albeit empirical results being inconclusive, a positive relationship between executive 
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compensation and firm performance would be consistent with agency theory, implying the 
incentive mechanism of executive compensation affecting positively the performance of 
the firm (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia 1998). 
According to the research by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994), the monitoring of executive 
compensation is significantly related to firm performance. The monitoring also reduces the 
influence of executives and consultants in the process of setting compensations (Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia 1989), preserving the compensation at lower levels. Although monitoring 
might be an effective way to counter executive opportunism, it can only do so much. A 
study by Coombs and Gilley (2005) show, that if executives were to pursue non-
shareholding stakeholder-related initiatives they risk jeopardizing their personal wealth. 
Even though in most cases these initiatives are expected from the executive and are 
monitored for, executives are hesitant to pursue them due to the risk of losing personal 
wealth. 
Even though performance linked executive compensation rests on the principles of agency 
theory, the pay-performance relationship can be argued to have very little relation to 
agency theory. The primary reason is that contingent compensation shifts risk from the 
principal to the agent, so that the agent‟s personal risk increases. In addition, performance 
related compensation strategy becomes illogical as an agent‟s control over the results 
decreases. Performance might suffer under the second best executive candidate, making it 
risky to replace the executive. (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2005.) 
Cadsby et al. (2007) presented another approach to pay-performance and agency theory 
relationship. Basing executive compensation on performance results in increased 
productivity, which is in accordance with the agency theory. However, risk-averse 
executives will be less responsive to the incentives related to this compensation. 
The general assumption underlying agency theory is that agents tend to be opportunists 
who will exploit owners, unless monitored effectively. Information asymmetries between 
agents and principals are expected to provide the basis for opportunism. It is assumed that 
an agent will exploit this to his own advantage, unless controlled or incentivized to do 
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otherwise. However, Miller and Sardais (2011) proposed another perspective on the 
principal-agent issue implying that the relationship is more complex than assumed 
previously. 
According to U.S. corporate law, agents are employed to serve one primary stakeholder, 
which are the owners of an institution. This is the key assumption in agency theory. 
Therefore, it is considered illegal for an agent to take any action or initiative that is 
determined not to be in the best interest of the owners. This statement assumes the owners 
to always be the responsible parties with the company‟s best interest in mind, while the 
agents are seen as self-seeking opportunists. However, sometimes an executive may be 
more motivated than an owner to do what is best for a company and its stakeholders. In 
this case, agent influence and independence as well as owner-agent information asymmetry 
may become beneficial for the sustainability of a firm. This can be argued to be in the best 
interest of most stakeholders. (Miller & Sardais 2011.) 
There has also been criticism of the assumptions related to agency theory. These three 
assumptions being the principal-agent issue, nature of risk, and mechanisms to reduce 
agency costs. Some argue that human behavior and individual risk preferences are not fully 
and objectively covered by the generally assumed rules in agency theory. A study by 
Cuevas-Rodríguez, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman (2012) presents criticism on these factors. 
They argue that the context is the key factor in examining both interest and mechanisms 
for aligning interests of principals and agents. They use behavioral and organizational 
sciences to introduce an alternative perspective to describe the circumstances, which 
contradict the underlying assumptions in agency theory. These circumstances are in which 
honesty, loyalty, and trust in agents‟ behavior is possible and also the development of 
cooperative rather than contentious relationships. 
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2.2. Corporate governance 
In theory, the need for corporate governance rests on the fundamental idea of agency 
problem, where the ownership and the management of the company are separated and the 
executives have the opportunity to make business decisions in their own benefit with 
shareholders and stakeholders bearing the costs. These costs, generally referred as agency 
costs, can be lessened with some type of control and monitoring system incorporated in the 
organization. This system of checks and balances is generally referred as corporate 
governance. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 4.)  
Corporate governance consists of the institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices 
that determine which body within a company is empowered the make particular decisions, 
how the members of that body are chosen, and the norms that should guide decision-
making. Governance principles are based on rules of best practice, based on social norms 
or laws. (Monks 2011.) 
The most simplistic monitoring system of corporate governance consists of a board of 
directors to oversee management and an external audit to express an independent opinion 
on the reliability of accounting and financial statements. However, usually governance 
systems are influenced by a larger number of entities, as presented in Figure 1. These 
constituents include firm owners, creditors, customers, suppliers, labor unions, investment 
analysts, the media, and regulators. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 7.) 
20 
 
 
Figure 1. Determinants and participants in CG systems. Larcker & Tayan (2016): 7 
 
In addition to the entities directly influencing the corporate governance system of a firm, 
there are a broad set of external forces that influence the structure of the governance 
system. These forces include the efficiency of local capital markets, legal tradition, 
accounting standards, regulatory enforcement, and societal and cultural values. They serve 
as an external guiding and disciplining mechanism on managerial behavior. (Larcker & 
Tayan 2016: 8.) 
Figure 2 shows the governing bodies of Finnair Oyj, as presented in their corporate 
governance statement. The authority in Finnair is vested in the general meeting of 
shareholders. Annual general meeting decides on adoption of the financial statements, the 
use of profit, constitution of the Board and the members‟ remuneration, discharging CEO 
of liability, election of the Chairman of the Board, and election and remuneration of the 
auditor. 
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Figure 2. Governing bodies of Finnair. Finnair (2017) 
 
Shareholders‟ Nomination Board prepares and presents for the annual meeting the 
proposals for remuneration, structure, and size of the Board. The Nomination Boards 
responsibility is also to seek potential future candidates for Board members. (Finnair 
2017.) 
The Board represents all shareholders of the company and has a general duty to act 
diligently in the interest of the shareholders. The Board is accountable to the shareholders 
for the appropriate governance of the company and ensuring the companies operational 
activities are executed accordingly. The governance is specifically related to the reliability 
of financial reporting and effectiveness of the company‟s system of internal controls. 
(Finnair 2017.) 
The Board delegates some of its functions to the Audit Committee and the Compensation 
and Nomination Committee. Members for these committees are chosen among the 
members of the Board. The Audit Committee assists the Board in financial monitoring and 
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governance activities, especially related to accounting and financial reporting. The 
Compensation Committee assists the Board in matters related to the compensation and 
benefits of the CEO and other executives, as well as their performance evaluation, 
appointment and successor panning. (Finnair 2017.) 
As seen previously in Figure 1, there are several factors that influence the corporate 
governance system of a company. However, a governance system that a company adopts is 
not independent of its environment. Country-specific factors shape the governance system 
to work most efficiently in that specific scenario. These factors are efficient capital 
markets, legal traditions, accounting standards, regulatory enforcement, and societal and 
cultural values. Differences in these factors have to be taken into account when evaluating 
the prevalence and severity of agency problems and the type of governance mechanism 
needed to monitor and control opportunism. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 19.) 
Markets determine the prices for labor, natural resource and capital. When markets are 
efficient, prices reflect all the information made available to market participants at any 
given time. Accurate pricing is necessary for firms to make rational decisions about 
allocating capital to its most efficient uses, which in part will result in an increase in 
shareholder and firm value. If the markets are inefficient, prices are distorted, which will 
hinder corporate decision making.  (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 20.) 
The rights afforded to business owners and minority shareholders are greatly influenced by 
a country‟s legal tradition. Countries whose legal system is based on a tradition of common 
law afford more rights to shareholders than countries whose legal systems are based on 
civil law. However, if the legal system is corrupt or ineffective, alternative disciplining 
mechanisms are necessary in the governance process. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 22-23.) 
Accounting standards are critical in ensuring that financial statements give accurate 
information. Reliable accounting standards also ensure the proper oversight of 
management, because shareholders and governing bodies have information to measure 
performance and detect any underlying agency problems. Additionally, the board uses this 
23 
 
information to structure appropriate compensation incentives and bonuses. (Larcker & 
Tayan 2016: 23-24.) 
Accounting systems vary in different countries. In some countries, like the U.S. and Japan, 
accounting systems are rule-based. There are detailed rules for how accounting standards 
should be applied to various business activities. In other countries, like many European 
nations, general accounting concepts and recommendations are outlined, but the specific 
application is not always dictated. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 24.) 
Managerial behavior is also strongly influenced by the society in which a company 
operates. Activities that might be deemed acceptable in some countries are considered 
inappropriate in others. Cultural values also influence the relationship between the 
company and its shareholders and stakeholders. (Larcker & Tayan 2016: 27.) 
The principal legislative authorities on corporate governance of Finnish listed companies 
are the Companies Act, the Securities Market Act, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), 
the regulations and guidelines issued by the Financial Supervisory Authority, the rules and 
instructions for listed companies issued by Nasdaq Helsinki and the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code. 
The Finnish Corporate Governance Code is a collection of recommendations on good 
corporate governance for listed companies. The recommendations supplement the 
obligations set forth in the legislation. The objective of the code is to maintain and promote 
openness, transparency, and comparability, as well as good corporate governance, in a 
manner that enhances the competitiveness and success of Finnish listed companies. 
(Securities Market Association 2015.) 
The Corporate Governance Code is to be applied in accordance with the „comply or 
explain‟ principle. Therefore, it is expected that a company complies with all 
recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code. Deriving from the recommendations 
is acceptable for a good reason, but the reasons for this must be explained in the company 
reports along with which recommendations it is departing from and how the decision was 
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made. In other words, the company is deemed to be in compliance with the Corporate 
Governance Code even if it departs from individual recommendations, provided that the 
departures are reported and explained. (Securities Market Association 2015.) 
All publicly listed companies in Finland are expected to comply with the reporting 
principles introduced in October 2010. This states, among other things, that all firms must 
disclose the determinants and amount of compensation granted to the board members and 
the CEO. Executive team compensation should be reported as well, but some companies 
decide not to disclose the individual compensation for each member of the executive team.  
 
2.3. Compensation strategies 
Compensation strategy should attempt to tackle the existing agency problem. Rewards 
flexibility, through such incentive aligning methods as financial compensation and stock 
options, delivers rewards that have greater market sensitivity. (Sparrow 2008.) 
The pay packages for the company's top executives are not the same as the normal 
employee salaries or other kinds of employee compensations in the terms of purposes and 
form of payments. Top executives normally receive executive pay packages in addition to 
their basic salary as an extra reward or as compensation for their dedication to the 
company as well as for their success of boosting shareholder value. The pay package 
designs include six major compensation components such as salary, long-term incentives, 
short-term incentives, employee benefits, severance. (Bolton,  Mehran & Shapiro 2015: 
2139–2181.) 
Compensation package is generally divided to employment or severance agreement, 
incentive compensation and supplemental retirement plans. These three main components 
are usually used in conjunction, creating a structured compensation package to incentivize 
the employee for short-term and long-term performance. The use of these components is 
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also influenced by firm characteristics, which include organizational goals and time frames 
of achievement. (Bevan 2001.) 
Executive compensation consists of the actual financial compensation and usually some 
kind of other non-financial pay. The financial compensation usually includes salary, 
options, shares or bonuses in some ratio and amount. Executive compensation can be 
divided in cash and equity-based components of CEO compensation. Cash based 
compensation consists of salary and bonuses whilst equity-based compensation covers 
stock options and long-time incentive plans. (Brealey et al. 2011: 296-297.) 
According to Conyon (2014), "The base salary for executive pay is normally stated as an 
annual salary, although it is typically paid monthly or bi-weekly, similar to other salaried 
staff”. In fact, the amount of pay for executives will be different depending on the type of 
job, size of organization, type of industry and the region of the country. The search shows 
that 40% to 60% of the executive's annual compensations originates from their salaries 
(Conyon 2014). However, it is not a significant amount of money because it will have to be 
deducted for tax calculation. Therefore, most of the companies tend to choose other forms 
of executive compensation like attractive perks or offered incentives, which can help their 
top executives to avoid the deduction. 
Cash bonuses have been until recently the primary method of incentive compensation. 
Bonuses are generally linked to some organizational or individual goal, which is based on 
employee performance or time in the firm. Performance criteria can base on accounting 
measures such as net income and equity or asset targets, but can also be based on a 
comprehensive analysis of an organizations economic performance. This links the cash 
bonus to fluctuations in stockholder value. (Bevan 2001.) 
Equity, or the non-cash payment that represents ownership in the firm an executive 
receives, is an essential part of executive compensation. Equity-based compensations 
usually need to be approved by a shareholder vote. The amount of equity used in 
compensation packages doubled between 1993 and 2003 (Bebchuck and Grinstein 2005) 
which speaks volumes of its popularity as a part of the compensation package. While in 
26 
 
theory “executives who hold equity in the companies they manage -- have greater incentive 
to improve the economic value of the firm” (Larcker & Tayan 2016), in practice the results 
are mixed.  
Equity compensation is catching on to the traditional cash bonus compensation becoming 
the primary means of incentivizing executives. Equity compensation is directly correlated 
with organizational performance, which answers to the increasing pressure from the board 
of directors and shareholders that prefer the executive compensation structured so it 
reflects individual as well as company performance. Stock-based incentive plans are 
generally categorized into four main types, which are employee stock options, restricted 
stock, phantom stock and stock appreciation rights (SAR). Including stock options to the 
total compensation tie the executives‟ compensation even more to company performance, 
motivating the individual to enhance firm performance as well as stay with the company. 
(Bevan 2001.) 
Stock options work in a way that the employee has the right, but not obligation, to buy the 
company stock at a predetermined exercise price. Generally the exercise price is equal to 
the company‟s stock price on the day of granting the option. If the company performs well 
and stock price increases, the employee will benefit from the increase in stock price and 
should execute the option. The employee will profit from the difference in exercise price 
and current price. In case the stock price decreases below the level of the initial exercise 
price, the executive can leave the option contract unexercised, which will result in no 
financial profit or loss. Alternatively, the employee can wait for the stock price to make a 
recovery or hope for compensation through other channels. (Brealey et al. 2011: 297) 
Restricted stock refers to unregistered shares of ownership in a company that are issued to 
employees under some conditions. The stock is nontransferable and must be held typically 
for a set amount of years. Performance shares on the other hand are regular stock awarded 
only if the company meets an earnings or some other target (Brealey et al. 2011: 297.) 
Phantom or shadow stock plans simulate stock option plans but without actually issuing 
any equity. Rather than getting any physical stock, the employee receives phantom stock 
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that follows the price movement of the company‟s actual stock, paying out any resulting 
profits. Like phantom stock, stock appreciation rights (SAR) follow the stock price 
fluctuation providing for a cash bonus equal to the excess of the fair market value of the 
company‟s stock at the date of exercise over the value at the date of grant. (Bevan 2001.) 
Vesting is a process through which an employee acquires full ownership of a certain asset, 
usually retirement funds, stock options or other benefit plan. Vesting schedule is simply 
the timetable for the process of earning full ownership of the asset. Traditionally one 
becomes “fully vested” over time, which is referred to as time-based vesting, but vesting 
schedule may also be based on performance. This type of vesting process can use 
accounting performance, stock performance or nonfinancial performance as metrics to 
evaluate the level of achieved performance (Larcker & Tayan 2016). Performance-based 
vesting seems to have started replacing time-based vesting in the last years. While time-
based vesting may create an incentive to stay in the company, it doesn‟t provide a 
sufficient financial motivation whereas performance-vesting companies seem to 
outperform the control groups (Bettis, Bizjak, Coles & Kalpathy, 2010). 
Optimally structured compensation should generally include all the elements of cash and 
equity based compensation. However, the amount of compensation should be in line with 
the company‟s financial variables as well as the employee‟s performance variables. 
Cao and Wang (2013) produced an extensive study on optimal executive compensation. 
The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between CEO‟s pay-to-
performance sensitivity (PPS) and a firm‟s risk. The paper also examines the factors that 
explain the recent trend of significantly increasing CEO compensation, which came with 
increase in firm size. 
According to standard agency models, pay-to-performance sensitivity does not change 
with firm risk if the agent is risk neutral and decreases if the agent is risk averse. However, 
the empirical evidence on the firm risk on PPS is mixed. The study argues that PPS is 
significantly affected by two factors, which are CEO job mobility and composition of risk 
faced by a firm. When different firms are competing for CEOs, each firm wants to 
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structure the contract so that their firm has the best chances in retaining the CEO. 
Therefore, changes in market conditions might have an effect on PPS by affecting the level 
of competition for CEOs. PPS is affected by risk structure through the change in 
idiosyncratic or unsystematic risk when the CEO switches between firms. The empirical 
test using executive compensation data confirm that the equilibrium pay-to-performance 
sensitivity depends positively on a firm‟s idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the 
systematic risk. Moreover, optimal PPS ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk 
neutral. (Cao & Wang 2013.) 
The board of directors is initially accountable in matters pertaining to the compensation 
and benefits as well as performance evaluation of the CEO and other senior management. 
However, in larger companies, a compensation committee is nominated to assist the Board 
in such matters. The Committee assists the Board also in establishing and evaluating 
compensation structures and other personnel policies. They review and confirm the 
achievements of targets for short-term incentives and approve of the payment of incentives 
to the according executives. 
Firms can quite freely dictate the level and structure of executive compensation, but there 
are some limitations. Following the economic meltdown of 2008 triggered by the collapse 
of such established investment services as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns 
and AIG, the emphasis shifted to excessive executive pay. The compensation experts 
noticed that executive compensation was both the symptom and the cause of the instability 
in the financial sector. This led to an increased focus on excessive executive remuneration 
resulting in significant level of involvement by the federal government in regulating the 
structure and disclosure of executive compensation. (Schneider 2011.) 
The government involvement led to the introduction of new legislation, in particular the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. First to be affected by the new legislation were institutions that 
were receiving financial assistance through the Treasury Department‟s Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP). They experienced several rounds of increasingly intrusive 
restrictions on executive compensation. Shortly after, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
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and Consumer Protection Act (the Act) was signed into law that had a direct and 
significant impact on the executives, directors and shareholders of publicly traded 
companies. The Acts executive compensation and corporate governance provisions 
affected several matters, including recovery of erroneously awarded compensation, 
executive compensation disclosures and internal pay equity, disclosures regarding 
executive and director hedging, voting by brokers, CEO duality and compensation 
committee independence. (Schneider 2011.) 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Corporate governance and firm performance 
Agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards 
perform better. In particular, it implies that a better governance system should result in 
better performance and higher valuation due to lower agency costs. This prediction is 
supported by a number of studies. However, the research results and the significance seem 
to have some variation, which could be due to different measures of corporate governance. 
The empirical studies can be divided into two approaches. The first approach is to use a 
composite index in measurement of corporate governance. The second approach is to focus 
on a single attribute of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and board 
characteristics. 
McKinsey & Company conducted a survey to examine the relevance of corporate 
governance to institutional investors. Nearly 80 percent of the investors responded that 
they would pay a premium for a well-governed company. The size of the premium varied 
across countries and markets. (Coombes & Watson 2002.) 
 
Figure 3. Indicated premiums for good corporate governance. Coombes & Watson (2002) 
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As seen in Figure 3, the size of the premium is significantly higher in countries with 
perceived unstable conditions, which highlights the importance of good corporate 
governance. These results imply that investors perceive well-governed firms to be better 
investments than poorly governed firms. 
A study by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) examines corporate governance and firm 
performance by constructing a Governance Index (G-Index) with 24 governance rules to 
examine shareholder rights. Their data consist of 1500 large firms during the 1990s. The 
study finds that better corporate governance is associated with higher firm valuation as 
measured by Tobin‟s Q, as well as higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditure, and fewer corporate acquisitions. 
Brown and Caylor (2006, 2009) use a similar approach by constructing a Gov-Score that is 
based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both external and internal governance. 
Both studies imply this measure in the regression and find that better-governed U.S. firms 
have higher return on equity, higher return on assets, and higher Tobin‟s Q. 
Bhagat & Bolton (2008) examine the effect of corporate governance on firm operating 
performance and stock performance. The study uses the G-Index (Gompers et al. 2003), as 
well as the E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell 2009), to measure the corporate 
governance of a firm. Findings suggest that better governance measured by these indices, 
stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively 
correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. However, 
none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) research how corporate governance affects firm value. 
The study compares the value and use of cash holdings in both scenarios of corporate 
governance. Results show that $1.00 of cash in a firm with bad corporate governance is 
valued at $0.42 to $0.88, while good corporate governance approximately doubles the 
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initial amount in valuation. Findings indicate that good corporate governance has a 
substantial positive impact on U.S. firms‟ value. 
Sami, Wang & Zhou (2011) studied the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance and valuation on Chinese firms. The study uses a composite measure of 
corporate governance, Governance-Score, as the independent variable. ROA and ROE are 
used to measure accounting performance, and Tobin‟s Q is used to measure firm value. 
Result show a positive and significant relationship with the composite measure, which 
suggests that better governed firms perform better in China.  
Zabri, Ahmad & Wah (2016) examined the corporate governance practices in Malaysia 
and its effects on firm performance. The data consists of top 100 publicly listed companies 
in Malaysia from 2008 to 2012. The study used board size and board independence as 
dependent variables of corporate governance, and ROA and ROE as independent variables 
of firm performance. Results suggest there is a significant negative relationship with board 
size and ROA, while the results on ROE were insignificant. The study also finds no 
significant relationship with board independence and measures of firm performance. 
Ararat, Black & Yurtoglu (2017) conducted a study to examine the corporate governance 
practices of Turkish publicly listed firms from 2006 to 2012. They constructed a broad 
index (TCGI) on Turkish data to proxy for corporate governance practices. The study uses 
this index to determine the impact of firm-level governance on firm market value and 
profitability. Results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in governance predicts an 
8-10% increase in firm value, measured by Tobin‟s Q. This significance increase in firm 
value is mainly driven by the Disclosure Subindex of TCGI. The study also finds weak 
positive relationship with governance and profitability. 
The overall consensus seems to be that better governed firms yield better operating results 
as well as increased firm valuation. Corporate governance and firm performance seems to 
keep its significance across countries and different time periods. However, it can be 
assumed that the positive effect is stronger in the countries and areas that have a bigger 
premium for corporate governance, as seen in Figure 3. 
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3.2. CEO compensation and firm performance 
Mehran (1995) conducted an early study on the subject of executive compensation and 
incentive alignment examining executive compensation structure of 153 randomly selected 
manufacturing firms in the years 1979-1980.  The results, in which Tobin‟s Q and return 
on assets are regressed against equity-based CEO compensation, show a highly significant 
positive relationship. This suggests that the performance-based part of the total 
compensation is linked to firm value. Similar results are found, when regressing against 
percentage of shares and stock options held by CEOs. 
Findings provide evidence, which supports performance-pay and incentive compensation. 
However, the study suggests that better structured compensation, rather than the total 
amount of compensation, motivates the executive to increase firm value. Furthermore, firm 
performance is positively correlated to the percentage of equity held by executives and to 
the percentage of their compensation that is equity based. Taking into consideration the 
relatively old sample, findings do support the modern compensation structure that is 
increasingly concentrated on equity based compensation and other long-term compensation 
strategies. (Mehran 1995.) 
A study by Tao (2010) researches the effect of incentivizing top executives and the 
relationship between compensation and performance on machinery and equipment listing 
enterprise performance in 2006-2008. The results show that effective compensation 
structure, compensation level and stable and positive changes in compensation of top 
executives can increase firm performance significantly. However, when stock ownership of 
top executives is at low level in the firm, stock ownership has a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
From the sample, a low percentage (10.68% respectfully) of companies  had top executives 
shareholding of over 50%. Even though most of the companies have low proportion of 
total compensation in equity pay, over half of the companies had at least some top 
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executive shareholdings, which shows that even more companies realize the importance of 
executive equity incentive. (Tao 2010.) 
Yue, Lan and Jiang (2008) conducted a similar study looking into the relationship between 
firm performance and the structure and levels of executive compensation on Chinese listed 
companies. The regression results show that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the annual compensation of executives and performance of the companies, 
accounting for both returns on equity and earnings per share as performance measures. 
Furthermore, firm performance is independent of the shares allocated to top executives and 
there is no so called interval effect. 
Similar results are provided by Zhang, Huang and Hu (2010) when conducting an 
empirical study of the possible correlation between executive compensation and corporate 
performance based on the Chinese listed companies in 2009. The purpose of their study 
was to analyze this relationship in hopes to find deficiencies and insufficiencies and help 
devise and improve managerial incentive compensation strategies. By examining and 
developing the incentive system, they hope to enhance the effectiveness of senior 
management incentive while supporting the performance of Chinese companies and overall 
economic development. The study measures the dependent variable, which is executive 
compensation, with natural logarithms of total executive compensation and shareholdings 
by executives. Company performance is measured with net assets income rate and Tobin‟s 
Q. 
The findings show a significant positive correlation between the total amount of company 
executive compensation and corporate performance, although compensation is 
significantly and positively related to the size of the company. In smaller proportion, the 
proportion of executive shares is positively related to corporate performance. However, the 
number and proportion of the executive shares was quite small compared to other 
countries, so it can be argued to have little or no effect on motivating the management to 
improve firm performance. (Zhang et al. 2010.) 
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Kuo, Li and Yu (2013) use panel-data threshold models to examine the non-uniform 
relation between CEO equity-based compensation and earning-based performance. The 
sample data consists of U.S. S&P 500 companies from 1994 to 2008. Their empirical 
results show a positive correlation with CEO equity compensation and firm performance. 
The correlation is significantly noticeable for companies with lower and moderate levels of 
equity-based managerial compensation, as well as less profitable firms. Findings show that 
under the critical equity pay ratio of 0.0852, an increase in the level of CEO equity 
compensation ratio enhances firm performance. As the level of CEO equity pay ratios goes 
beyond 0.4633, they notice that an increase in CEO equity pay might have a negative 
effect on firm performance. The results suggest that excessive equity-based compensation 
no longer compliments firm performance, and that share-based compensation is more 
effective for smaller scale start-up firms with low profit expectations. 
Gigliotti (2013) conducted a study with an objective to find evidence of the correlation 
between executive remuneration and corporate performance measured by return on equity, 
return on assets and return on investment. The study consists of a sample of 145 listed 
Italian companies between the years 2004 and 2009. The study reported an average annual 
growth of 15% in executives‟ pay for the first four years, but dropping over 19% in 2008 
due to the global financial crisis. 
Findings do not show that there is a significant correlation between company performance 
and executive compensation. Taking into consideration how executive pay in family 
businesses remains lower than in other companies, results seem to be consistent with 
earlier studies. Moreover, results showed that there are several situations in which, in the 
face of reduction in the average profitability of the period, executive pay still shows 
average growth. However, findings suggest a greater correlation between remuneration and 
company size, in terms of stock turnover, which demonstrates the likely presence of a 
dimensional premium that is to the benefit of executives of larger companies. (Gigliotti 
2013.) 
A study by Ozkan (2011) uses UK panel data of 390 non-financial firms during 1999-2005 
to examine the link between CEO pay and performance. It is suggested that previous 
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results showing a weak link might be missing a critical component that is equity based 
compensation. In addition to accounting for equity based compensation, the study controls 
for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables to determine whether they 
influence level of CEO compensation and pay-performance sensitivity. 
The empirical results indicate that pay-performance elasticity for UK top executives is 
0,075 for cash based compensation. This implies that a ten percentage increase in 
shareholder return is equal to an increase of 0.75% in CEO cash compensation. The pay-
performance elasticity for total compensation, including equity-based pay, is 0.095, which 
is higher when comparing to the elasticity of only cash compensation. This means that a 
ten percentage increase in shareholder return results in a 0.95% increase in CEO total 
compensation. In comparison to previous findings for U.S. CEOs, pay-performance 
elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower. (Ozkan 2011.) 
Results show that CEO total compensation is positively correlated with firm size, number 
of board of directors and the number of non-executive directors on the board. Correlation 
with firm size implies that there is a dimensional premium that benefits the CEOs of larger 
companies. Bigger firms want to invest in and incentivize talented CEOs to join and stay 
with the firm. Bigger board is associated generally with larger firms, which is consistent 
with the earlier statement. Higher proportion of non-executive directors on board 
associated with higher compensation level can be explained by non-executive directors not 
providing monitoring in determining CEO compensation. (Ozkan 2011.) 
The results show significant negative relationship with CEO compensation level and non-
executive directors‟ share ownership. Additionally, institutional and blockholder 
ownership was found to have a significant negative correlation on the level of CEO cash 
compensation as well as total compensation. Although, this ownership structure seems to 
have a significant positive impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity of option grants. 
The findings also showed that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay-
performance sensitivity of option grants, which suggests the entrenchment effect of CEO 
tenure. (Ozkan 2011.) 
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The overall findings from this subject seem to show a significant relationship with 
executive pay and firm size. Firm performance seems to be a secondary factor to the level 
of compensation. Furthermore, cultural differences seem to have an effect on the level and 
structure of the compensation as well as the significance of the pay-performance 
relationship. 
 
3.3. CEO compensation and cultural dimensions 
Executive incentive strategies seem to vary across countries and cultures. When comparing 
the results from studies from the U.S. and China, we can see a significant difference. In 
most cases the correlation between executive compensation and firm performance is 
negative in the U.S. but positive in China. This association might be explained by the 
cultural differences in leadership strategies or organizational goals. 
Tosi & Greckhamer (2004) conducted a study examining CEO compensation in cultural 
context. The study related cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (Hofstede 1980, 
2001) to several dimensions of CEO compensation. The dimensions of executive 
compensation include total CEO compensation, the proportion of variable pay to total 
compensation (VC/TC), and the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of lowest level employee in 
the company. The study uses data from 23 different countries from 1997 to 2001. 
First, the paper finds that total CEO pay is positively correlated with power distance and 
individualism. Second, the proportion of variable pay to total compensation is positively 
associated with individualism and negatively associated with uncertainty avoidance. 
Additionally, the pay gap between the highest and lowest level employee in the firm is 
positively associated with power distance and masculinity. (Tosi & Greckhamer 2004.) 
Bryan, Nash & Patel (2015) find relatively similar significant dimensions, when examining 
how differences in national culture might contribute to differences in executive contract 
design. They use differences in individualism score and uncertainty avoidance index to 
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study its effect on the proportion of equity-based compensation across countries. The data 
consist of 39 countries from 1996 until 2009. Findings show that differences in degree of 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance are significantly associated with variations in the 
structure of compensation, the proportion of variable pay to total compensation.  
A closer look at the cultural dimensions reveals significant differences between the 
countries. Figure 4 shows the cultural dimensions of China, Finland, the U.K. and the U.S. 
Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) found significant association with power distance and 
individualism in relation to the level of CEO compensation. Therefore, those two will be 
inspected more closely. 
Power distance addresses the assumption that all individuals in a society are not equal. It 
shows how a culture sees inequalities among us. A high level of power distance means that 
inequalities amongst people are acceptable and there is a conscious social hierarchy 
determined by authority and position of power. A low level of power distance is 
characterized by decentralized power, equal rights, and accessible superiors. Hierarchy is 
established for convenience only. (Hofstede Inshights 2018.) 
Individualism represents the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its 
members. A high level of individualism puts emphasis on individual work, objectives and 
success. A low level of individualism, collectivism, is characterized by team-effort, loyalty 
to a group, and societal and organizational success. (Hofstede Inshights 2018.) 
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Figure 4. Cultural dimensions country comparison. Hofstede Insights (2018) 
 
As seen in Figure 4, China has a high level of power distance compared to the U.S. and 
rest of the inspected countries. As for individualism, the U.S. and the U.K. have extremely 
high values compared to China. Finland seems to place in the middle, slightly leaning to 
the group of high level of individualism. 
Both power distance and individualism have been shown to have a positive association to 
the level of total CEO compensation. However, those cultural dimensions seem to be of 
opposing nature. If a society has a high level of power distance, level of individualism 
seems to be low. This makes it difficult to construct reliable deductions based on the 
information. However, level of individualism seems more likely to have a significant 
association with pay-performance sensitivity. 
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3.4. CPS and firm performance 
CEO pay slice is a relatively new measure used in research. It measures the fraction of the 
aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive 
Officer. CPS is used to evaluate the relative appreciation of the CEO to the rest of the 
executive team, and CEO dominance. 
This measure was first introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2011) in the paper The CEO Pay 
Slice. The study examines the association between CPS and firm value, performance, and 
behavior. The study uses data from the U.S. publicly listed firms from 1993 to 2004. 
Using pooled panel regressions with year dummies, the study finds that higher CPS has a 
strong association with lower firm value as measured with industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q. A 
one standard deviation increase in CPS results in a 5.5% reduction in the following year‟s 
Tobin‟s Q. Results also indicate that CPS is negatively correlated with accounting 
profitability (ROA) and stock returns accompanying pre-announced acquisitions. A one 
standard deviation increase in CPS is associated with a 0.48% decrease in ROA the 
following year. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is 
associated with agency problems, and relatively highly appreciated CEO decreases firm 
value. (Bebchuk et al. 2011.) 
Tarkovska (2017) finds similar results examining the relationship between CPS and value 
of the publicly listed firms in the UK from 1997 to 2010. The study uses two different 
types of calculations for CPS, which include either three or five executives. Additionally, 
one model uses industry-adjusted CPS as an independent variable. Findings show a 
significant negative correlation between firm value and CPS on all measures of CPS. 
Results report that one standard deviation increase in CPS is associated with approximately 
a 7.84 percent decrease in Tobin‟s Q. 
The paper suggested a hypothesis that a high CPS level distinguishes a company‟s CEO 
and helps create a competition spirit, which should result in better corporate performance. 
However, results support better the agency problem argument and social comparison 
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argument, which state that higher CPS harms executive board effectiveness by hindering 
team cohesiveness and motivation. (Tarkovska 2017.) 
Al-Najjar, Ding & Hussainey (2016) conduct a study that examines the determinants of 
CPS and its relationship to measures of firm performance. The study uses similar data than 
Tarkovska (2017) but a shorter time period. In addition to the conventional CPS, the paper 
uses ECPS as an explanatory variable in some models in place of CPS. This measures the 
proportion of equity-based or variable pay captured by the CEO relative to other 
executives. The main performance measures are Tobin‟s Q and ROE. 
Surprisingly, findings show that CPS is positively correlated with future firm performance 
measured with Tobin‟s Q and ROE, as well as higher corporate governance ratings and 
board independence. The results on equity-based CPS are similar, suggesting a positive 
association with all tested measures of firm performance. Findings support the managerial 
talent hypothesis, which states that UK CEOs have outstanding capability and skills that 
enhance firm performance and therefore are compensated accordingly. (Al-Najjar et al. 
2016.)  
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4. DATA 
 
Data set for this study consists of executive compensation data as well as accounting data 
and ratios for Finnish publicly traded firms in OMX Helsinki stock exchange, excluding 
the financial sector, during 2010-2017. In total, the data set consist of 108 companies and 
eight years of observations. The executive compensation data for Finnish firms is not 
available in any database at this time. However, due to the recommendations set forth by 
the Finnish Securities Market Association in 2010, publicly traded firms in Finland have to 
present the governing principles along with the compensation data in their annual 
reporting. 
This study uses the executive compensation data collected by hand from either annual 
reports, corporate governance reports, or remuneration reports of each individual firm and 
year. Executive compensation is measured as the total compensation reported by the firm 
including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted that 
year, long-term incentive payouts, and all other total compensation. If reported, resignation 
fees and payouts to former executives are excluded from the calculations. Also, the years 
when the CEO changes, the firm is listed, or the fiscal year is not equal to a calendar year, 
are excluded from the dataset. Additionally, foreign currency compensation data is 
converted to euro currency with the year average exchange rate, and each compensation to 
an executive is collected as accrual basis at the accuracy of 1,000€. 
Executive team compensation data is collected with the same principles. However, 
compensation data for individual executive team members are almost never reported. 
Annual reports usually specify the remuneration of the CEO and  rest of the executive team 
as a whole. Therefore, in order to calculate CPS in accordance with Bebchuk et al. (2011), 
total executive team compensation has to be divided by the average number of executive 
team members during that year, excluding the CEO. 
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Firm data is collected from Orbis database. Performance measures used in the study are 
industry-adjusted to account for the industry-specific variations in each industry‟s 
acceptable values. Each industry median is calculated from all firms in Orbis database 
matching the 4-digit SIC code, excluding small firms with less than 50 employees and 
inactive firms. 
Figure 5 presents the yearly average and median total compensation of CEOs and 
executive team members in the firms studied. During the researched period, there can be 
seen a slight overall upward trend in CEO total compensation. However, executive team 
member compensation seems to remain roughly at the same level, or experience a minimal 
increase. 
 
Figure 5. Median and average compensation 
 
Figure 6 shows CEO total compensation and executive team member average total 
compensation plotted on a graph. The compensation data seems to have a linear nature, 
which can be seen from the trendlines goodness of fit. The calculated linear equation 
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shows that CEO total compensation is estimated to be 2.74 times the compensation of an 
executive team member. 
 
 
Figure 6. Compensation data scatterplot 
 
Table 1 below presents the summary statistics of the dataset. The table includes ten 
variables used in the regressions. Natural logarithm of total executive compensation is 
denoted as LOG(EC). The number of observations for LOG(EC) and CPS are slightly 
smaller compared to the other variables due to some of the compensation data being 
unavailable. Industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q is denoted as ADJQ and industry-adjusted ROA 
as ADJROA. Company size variable is measured by natural logarithm of total assets and 
denoted as LOG(SIZE). The natural logarithm of age of the firm is denoted as LOG(AGE). 
Research and development intensity is measured by dividing R&D expenses by sales and 
is denoted as R&D/SALES. Leverage is calculated by dividing total debt by total assets. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
  
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum StDev Nobs
LOG(EC) 6.288 6.242 9.160 4.174 0.812 618
CPS 0.373 0.368 0.794 0.102 0.083 570
TOBINSQ 1.012 0.734 15.085 0.071 1.143 751
ADJQ 0.298 0.045 13.953 -1.617 1.058 751
ROA 2.389 3.756 52.762 -90.367 11.742 799
ADJROA -1.153 0.406 51.431 -93.153 11.810 799
LOG(SIZE) 12.488 12.378 17.620 8.226 2.016 804
LOG(AGE) 3.635 3.611 5.908 0.000 0.966 855
R&D/SALES 0.025 0.004 0.511 -0.093 0.056 739
LEVERAGE 0.578 0.569 3.356 0.087 0.242 799
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) LOG(EC) 1.000
(2) CPS 0.518 1.000
(3) TOBINSQ -0.028 -0.021 1.000
(4) ADJQ 0.003 0.028 0.959 1.000
(5) ROA 0.214 0.218 0.356 0.355 1.000
(6) ADJROA 0.236 0.242 0.315 0.331 0.991 1.000
(7) LOG(SIZE) 0.833 0.358 -0.178 -0.115 0.150 0.195 1.000
(8) LOG(AGE) 0.146 0.068 -0.032 -0.043 0.161 0.171 0.044 1.000
(9) R&D/SALES -0.008 -0.109 0.262 0.189 -0.133 -0.147 -0.112 -0.016 1.000
(10) LEVERAGE 0.093 -0.106 -0.425 -0.403 -0.396 -0.388 0.173 -0.088 -0.271 1.000
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Table 2 shows the cross-correlations between the variables. The variables are denoted 
identical to the previous table for easier comparability. The values represent the 
correlations and the bold formatting indicates cross-correlation statistical significance at 
1% level. The dependent variables in the following empirical part of this thesis will be 
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q (ADJQ) and industry-adjusted ROA (ADJROA). The main 
independent variables are natural logarithm of total CEO compensation (EC) and CEO pay 
slice (CPS). 
Total executive compensation has a positive statistically significant correlation with ROA 
and industry-adjusted ROA, as well as firm size measured by total assets and the age of the 
firm. CPS has significant positive correlation with identical variables, except firm age. It 
can be assumed that total CEO compensation and the proportion of executive 
compensation issued to the CEO, is significantly dependent on firms operating 
performance and size. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
In the first part of the study, performance measures are regressed to total CEO 
compensation. In the second part of the study, the independent variable is CPS, which is 
the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of top five executives‟ total compensation. 
The following equation expresses the calculation formula for CPS by Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), where P1 is the total compensation of the CEO and P2 to P5 are the total 
compensations of the four most highly compensated executive team members following 
the CEO. 
(1)      
  
              
 
Due to limitations in data for the Finnish firms, CPS in this study is calculated by the 
following formula. In this formula, the average total compensation for an executive team 
member, excluding the CEO, is denoted by PExecuTeam . 
(2)      
  
               
 
This study uses two measures of performance as dependent variables: industry-adjusted 
Tobin‟s q and industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA). Return on assets is calculated by 
dividing operating income by book value of asset. It indicates the profitability of a firm 
relative to its assets. 
Tobin‟s Q ratio is a performance measure and a tool to determine the value of a firms 
stock. Tobin‟s Q is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the 
replacement value of the firm‟s assets. Although Tobin‟s Q doesn‟t take into account the 
other factors determining a firm‟s market value, it is a valid measure in comparing the 
performance of companies in the same industry. The initial assumption is that a firm 
should only be worth what their assets are worth, implying a Q value equal to one. A 
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company with a low Q ratio, between 0 and 1, the cost to replace a firm‟s assets is greater 
than the value of its stock. This suggests that the firm and its stock is undervalued. On the 
other hand, high Q ratio of over 1 implies that the firm‟s stock is more expensive than the 
replacement cost of its assets, which suggests that the firms stock is overvalued. (Tobin 
1969.) 
The first part of the empirical section examines the relationship between total CEO 
compensation and firm performance measures. Using pooled OLS regression, the 
dependent variables are Tobin‟s Q and ROA, both industry-adjusted to standardize the 
possible variations across industries. The main independent variable is lagged natural 
logarithm of total CEO compensation. In Equation 3, ROA is used as a control variable. 
However, Equation 4 uses lagged industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q as a control variable in 
place of ROA. This is made, to account for the high correlation between adjusted ROA and 
ROA. 
(3) AdjQit = β0  + β1 Ln(CEOit-1) + β2 ROAit + λ Controlsit + εit 
(4) AdjROAit = β0 + β1 Ln(CEOit-1) + β2 AdjQit-1 + λ Controlsit + εit 
The second part examines the performance measures relationship with CPS. The following 
models were formulated mainly in accordance with the regression formulas used in the 
paper by Bebchuk et al. (2011). Slight derivations from the original models were inevitable 
due to data availability for Finnish firms. The main independent variable in Equations 5 
and 6 is lagged CPS. 
(5) AdjQit = β0 + β1 CPSit-1 + β2 ROAit + λ Controlsit + εit 
(6) AdjROAit = β0 + β1 CPSit-1 + β2 AdjQit-1 + λ Controlsit + εit 
The regressions will include the standard controls used in the literature. In particular, the 
study controls for firm size (logs of book value of assets), profitability (ROA), R&D 
intensity (R&D expenses to sales), leverage (total debt to total assets), and log of the age of 
the firm (Shin and Stulz 2000). Bebchuk et al. (2001) used a dummy variable in their study 
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to indicate missing data for R&D. However, this method is not used in the regressions to 
minimize the bias in results. 
Table 3 shows the results of the Hausman test. Models 1-4 are specified in Equations 3-6. 
Hausman test is executed to determine, which model is more appropriate to use, fixed or 
random effects model. The null hypothesis in this test implies that random effect model is 
preferred. The alternative hypothesis recommends the fixed effect model. 
Table 3. Hausman test results 
 
Interpreting the results, it can be seen that fixed effect model is preferred in models 1, 3 
and 4 as the p-value is under 5%. The null hypothesis with Model 2 cannot be rejected at 
5% significance level and therefore random effect model is the preferred method. 
All regressions use White error correction method. Standard errors based on this procedure 
are called robust standard errors. Although the structure of heteroskedasticity is not known, 
it is preferred to use robust standard errors.   
Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Model Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
1 22.413 6 0.001
2 9.055 6 0.171
3 22.380 6 0.001
4 14.868 6 0.021
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6. RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results from the regressions determining the effect of 
executive compensation on firm performance. This study testes both total CEO 
compensation and the ratio of compensation between executives against the most 
commonly used measures in research to evaluate firm value and accounting profitability. 
Both Tobin‟s Q and ROA are industry-adjusted to account for industry-specific variations 
in the values. 
Table 4 below reports the determinants of CEO compensation and CPS. These models 
show the association between the measures of executive compensation and firm 
characteristics. Examined independent variables are industry-adjusted firm value, 
accounting profitability, size, leverage, R&D intensity, and company age. 
The first model uses natural logarithm of total CEO compensation as a dependent variable. 
Results show that all independent variables, except leverage, are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This suggests that an increase in these factors results in a higher 
total compensation to the CEO. Company size seems to be the most significant factor in 
determining CEO compensation, which is indicated by the relatively high error corrected t-
statistic. This is also recognized by previous research on executive compensation (e.g. 
Zhang et al. 2010; Ozkan 2011; Gigliotti 2013). The adjusted R-squared for this model is 
relatively high (71.8% respectively), which implies that these factors explain the variations 
in total CEO compensation relatively accurately. 
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Table 4. Determinants of executive compensation and CPS 
 
 
The second model uses CPS as the dependent variable. ROA and size seem to have a 
positive correlation to CPS. As CPS measures the compensation ratio between executives, 
this means that an increase in those variables will result in a larger compensation to the 
CEO relative to the other members of the executive team. Additionally, leverage and R&D 
intensity have a negative association with CPS. However, the explanation power of this 
model is relatively low. These factors explain only 16.7% of the variations in CPS. 
 
Variables
Log Executive compensation CPS
Constant 1.537*** 0.229***
(8.418) (7.533)
Industry-adjusted Q 0.049*** -0.0005
(2.758) (-0.177)
ROA 0.006*** 0.0007**
(2.714) (2.047)
Log Book Value 0.337*** 0.015***
(33.399) (8.796)
Leverage 0.195 -0.091***
(1.401) (-3.116)
R&D to Sales 1.304*** -0.152***
(2.939) (-2.780)
Log Company Age 0.084*** 0.002
(4.203) (0.586)
NObs 562 517
R-squared 0.718 0.167
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6.1. CEO compensation 
This chapter presents the empirical results regressions for CEO compensation and firm 
performance. Compensation is measured as the total annual compensation for the CEO. 
This includes salary, equity compensation, and other variable compensation and perquisites 
granted that year. 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the following hypotheses were constructed. These 
hypotheses will be used in discussing the results of the relationship between total CEO 
compensation and firm operating performance and valuation. 
H0: CEO compensation does not affect firm performance 
 H1: CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance 
 H2: CEO compensation is negatively correlated with firm performance 
Previous research on executive compensation and firm performance has yielded mixed 
results. The correlation seems to vary depending on the data used. There is little research 
on executive compensation in the Nordic countries, which makes it difficult to derive 
assumptions on the possible findings of this study. 
Table 5 presents the results from the OLS regressions from total CEO compensation and 
firm valuation, measured by industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q. Regression model used in this 
table is specified in Equation 3. In models 1 and 3, ROA is omitted as a control variable. 
Models 3 and 4 use fixed effect model effect specification, as tested and presented in Table 
3. 
Error corrected t-statistic for the specific variable coefficient is reported below in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by asterisk following the coefficient, * for 
10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1% significance. 
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Table 5. Total CEO compensation and Tobin‟s Q 
 
 
The main model to study is Model 2. It can be seen that all independent variables show 
statistical significance, and the explanation power of the model is more than sufficient 
comparing to previous studies. Executive compensation has a high and significant positive 
association with firm valuation. This implies that a higher compensation to a Finnish CEO 
of a listed company will result in higher firm valuation. Interpreting the coefficient, a 1% 
increase in total CEO compensation will result approximately in a 0.004 increase in 
Tobin‟s Q the following year. 
Similarly, ROA and R&D intensity seem to have a positive correlation to firm valuation. 
This is logical due to ROA showing accounting profitability of the firm, which is linked to 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.943** 1.888** 1.478 1.210
(2.449) (2.522) (0.606) (0.486)
Log CEO compensation(-1) 0.453*** 0.386*** 0.274** 0.270**
2.756 (2.778) (-2.048) (2.104)
ROA 0.034*** 0.016
(2.995) (1.582)
Log Book Value -0.184** -0.197*** -0.449** -0.448*
-2.410 (-2.614) (-2.325) (-2.226)
Leverage -2.808*** -1.749*** -2.138*** -1.601***
-4.008 (-3.619) (-3.264) (-2.864)
R&D to Sales 2.474** 4.337*** -3.163 -1.719
2.085 (4.235) (-1.327) (-0.649)
Log Company Age -0.163** -0.189*** 1.101* 1.071*
-2.103 (-2.372) (1.823) (1.820)
NObs 489 487 489 487
R-squared 0.198 0.259 0.646 0.654
Effect specification None None Fixed Fixed
t-statistic  below the cofficient in parentheses.
Statistical significance shown by asterisk following the coefficient
Industry-adjusted Q
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firm valuation. Company size, leverage, and company age seem to affect firm value in a 
negative way.  
Model 1 yields similar results. Eliminating ROA from controls only slightly decreases the 
statistical significance of R&D intensity, firm size and age in the regression. However, all 
the factors are still significant at 5% significance level. 
Applying the fixed effect model specification yields relatively similar regression results. 
Total CEO compensation is positive and statistically significant at 5% level in both 
models. From the control variables, ROA and R&D intensity are no longer significant, and 
surprisingly the age of the firm seems to have a slight significant positive association with 
firm value. 
Table 6 presents the results from the OLS regressions from total CEO compensation and 
firm accounting profitability, measured by industry-adjusted return on assets. Regression 
model used in this table is specified in Equation 4. In models 1 and 3, lagged industry-
adjusted Tobin‟s Q is omitted as a control variable. T-statistic for the specific coefficient is 
reported below in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by asterisk following the 
coefficient, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1% significance. 
Models 1 and 2 show relatively similar results, although adjusted Q was omitted in the first 
model. CEO compensation seems to have a slight positive correlation with ROA, but lacks 
statistical significance. In Model 2, adjusted Q, firm size, and company age have a 
significant positive relationship with firm operational performance. However, the driving 
forces in this regression are leverage and R&D intensity, which both show strong negative 
correlation with industry-adjusted ROA. 
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Table 6. Total CEO compensation and ROA 
 
 
Models 3 and 4 show the random effect model results. The results are similar to those of 
models 1 and 2. CEO compensation has a positive coefficient but is not statistically 
significant. Industry-adjusted Q and firm size show a positive and significant correlation to 
firm operational performance. Leverage and R&D intensity have a negative and significant 
relationship with adjusted ROA. 
 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -3.334 -6.521 0.371 -3.603
(-0.722) (-1.419) (0.048) (-0.494)
Log CEO compensation(-1) 1.223 0.686 0.892 0.376
(1.404) (0.829) (1.005) (0.427)
Industry-adjusted Q(-1) 2.313*** 2.072***
(5.195) (4.103)
Log Book Value 0.922** 1.095*** 1.009* 1.243**
(2.110) (2.713) (1.759) (2.320)
Leverage -33.696*** -27.607*** -36.645*** -31.061***
(-7.922) (-7.089) (-6.693) (-6.254)
R&D to Sales -58.553*** -66.377*** -75.675*** -77.941***
(-4.612) (-5.127) (-4.782) (-4.894)
Log Company Age 0.986** 1.137** 0.760 0.920
(2.002) (2.372) (0.901) (1.178)
NObs 495 483 495 483
R-squared 0.321 0.372 0.264 0.306
Effect specification None None Random Random
t-statistic  below the cofficient in parentheses.
Statistical significance shown by asterisk following the coefficient
Industry-adjusted ROA
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6.2. CEO pay slice 
The second part of the results presents the regression results from studying CPS and firm 
performance. The following hypotheses were earlier constructed to research the possible 
relationship between CPS and firm performance. 
H0: CPS does not affect firm performance 
 H1: CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance 
 H2: CEO compensation is negatively correlated with firm performance 
There is little research conducted on CPS and there is no consensus on the effect of CPS on 
firm performance. Thus, the results from the regressions can clarify the significance of 
CPS as a measure of executive compensation. Additionally, it can act as a reference for 
further research on executive compensation on studies in the Nordic countries. 
Table 7 below shows the regression results with industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q as the 
dependent variable. The main model used in these regressions is specified in Equation 5, in 
the previous chapter. T-statistic is reported below in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted by asterisk following the coefficient, * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1% 
respectively. 
The first model shows no significant relationship between lagged CPS and industry-
adjusted Tobin‟s Q, although there is a positive coefficient. Leverage has a highly 
significant negative correlation with firm value. Therefore, excessive debt in relation to 
assets will result in lower firm value. Company age seems to have a negative relationship 
to firm value as well. 
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Table 7. CPS and Tobin‟s Q 
 
Model 2 includes ROA as an independent variable. The results are relatively similar to 
Model 1. Leverage has a highly significant negative relation to firm value. Firm size and 
age seem to have a negative correlation with Q. The more a company has assets or the 
older a company, the less it is valued measured by industry-adjusted Q. ROA and R&D 
intensity seem to have a significant positive relationship with firm value. However, CPS 
remains statistically insignificant in this model. 
Models 3 and 4 show the regressions with fixed effect model specification. CPS has no 
statistically significant coefficient in these models. Size and leverage show high and 
significant correlation with firm value. However, company age has a small positive 
correlation to firm value in these models. ROA as a control variable has no significance in 
Model 4. 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.728 2.705** 2.005 2.099
(2.342) (2.502) (0.919) (0.951)
CPS(-1) 0.628 0.320 0.050 -0.067
(1.153) (0.550) (0.107) (-0.139)
ROA 0.037*** 0.013
(2.701) (1.193)
Log Book Value -0.029 -0.0673** -0.401*** -0.417***
(-1.167) (-2.056) (-2.991) (-2.612)
Leverage -3.374*** -2.248*** -2.499*** -1.968***
(-3.817) (-3.945) (-3.068) (-3.113)
R&D to Sales 1.775 3.181*** 0.384 1.193
(1.358) (2.843) (0.120) (0.327)
Log Company Age -0.116* -0.156** 1.294* 1.239*
-1.718 (-2.124) (1.929) (1.919)
NObs 445 443 445 443
R-squared 0.187 0.258 0.637 0.642
Effect specification None None Fixed Fixed
t-statistic  below the cofficient in parentheses.
Statistical significance shown by asterisk following the coefficient
Industry-adjusted Q
58 
 
Table 8 shows the regression results from CPS and industry-adjusted ROA. The reference 
model used in these regressions is specified in Equation 6. T-statistic is reported below in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by asterisk following the coefficient, * for 
10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1% respectively. Models 3 and 4 use fixed effect model 
specification as a regression method. 
Table 8. CPS and ROA 
 
Model 2 shows the main results from these regressions. As can be seen, lagged CPS has a 
positive but not statistically significant coefficient. This implies that having a CEO with 
relatively high appreciation has no significant effect on company operational performance 
in the future. Changes in firm value seem to have a positive and significant association 
with operational performance, as well as size and age of a company. Leverage and R&D 
intensity have a highly significant negative relationship with firm operational performance. 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -4.803 -10.098** -4.540 -3.407
(-0.901) (-2.023) (-0.145) (-0.103)
CPS(-1) 5.344 5.737 3.502 5.709
(1.101) (1.285) (0.606) (0.843)
Industry-adjusted Q(-1) 2.645*** 1.573***
(5.373) (2.623)
Log Book Value 1.379*** 1.313*** 1.274 1.276
(5.039) (5.258) (0.389) (0.350)
Leverage -33.946*** -24.824*** -51.523*** -44.893***
(-6.345) (-5.019) (-5.200) (-4.459)
R&D to Sales -42.667*** -46.339*** -97.862* -92.711*
(-2.995) (-3.449) (-1.900) (-1.875)
Log Company Age 1.248*** 1.345*** 4.676 (3.044)
(2.688) (3.054) (0.922) (0.561)
NObs 451 440 451 440
R-squared 0.276 0.340 0.556 0.551
Effect specification None None Fixed Fixed
t-statistic  below the cofficient in parentheses.
Statistical significance shown by asterisk following the coefficient
Industry-adjusted ROA
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Omitting changes in firm value as a control variable in Model 1 has no effect on the 
results. Lagged CPS remains insignificant in the regression results. 
With fixed effect model specification in Models 3 and 4, the significance of CPS remains 
the same. However, company size and age seem to lose their significance. Leverage 
remains highly significant and negative to industry-adjusted ROA. R&D intensity has a 
slightly significant and negative association with operational performance. 
 
6.3. Hypothesis testing 
The positive correlation between CEO compensation and industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q 
identified in Table 5, is consistent with the alternative hypothesis. This hypothesis states 
that CEO compensation is positively correlated with firm performance. However, 
regressions with industry-adjusted ROA as a dependent variable results in total CEO being 
an insignificant factor, as shown in Table 6. This is consistent with the null hypothesis. 
From these findings, we can only reject the assumption that the amount of CEO 
compensation has a negative association with firm performance. 
Although the regression results are not consistent with a single hypothesis, it is evident that 
CEO compensation is significantly positively associated with firm value. This implies that 
CEOs of Finnish publicly listed companies are able to add value to the firm in regards to 
the level of compensation received. 
As seen in the previous section, CPS has no statistically significant correlation with either 
industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q or ROA. This is inconsistent with the previously constructed 
alternative hypotheses on CPS, which states that relatively higher remuneration of the CEO 
to the rest of the executive team has a significant effect on firm performance. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis should be accepted, which states that there is no significant association 
with CPS and firm performance. 
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The proportion of executive compensation captured by the CEO has no significant 
association with either firm value or accounting profitability in Finnish firms. As seen 
previously in Figure 4, there is not a significant amount of variation between the 
compensation to CEO and other top executives. This can be seen by the linear relationship 
of the two and the relatively high explanative power of the linear model. Firms that pay 
higher compensation to the CEO, generally pay higher compensation to the executive team 
members as well.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of the study was to examine the association between executive compensation 
and firm performance, as well as the significance of equal pay between executives 
measured by CPS. This study uses data from Finnish publicly listed companies from 2010 
to 2017. Main performance measures used in this study are industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q 
and ROA. 
Previous studies have yielded mixed results on both the effect of executive compensation 
and CPS on firm performance. Among other variations in methodologies, the mixed results 
of the studies might be explained by differences in compensation and leadership culture. 
From the cultural dimensions by Hofstede, particularly power distance and individualism is 
proved to have a positive correlation with CEO compensation. Executive compensation 
seems to have a negative association to firm performance in studies conducted on U.S. 
data. Asian countries, China in particular, seem to have a positive correlation with CEO 
compensation and firm performance. Research on European countries fall in the middle, 
for they tend to have either positive or negative results. The cultural dimensions might be 
used to interpret the differing results from previous research. 
The results from this study show a significant positive association with total CEO 
compensation and firm value, as measured with Tobin‟s Q. A 1% increase in total CEO 
compensation will result approximately in a 0.004 increase in Tobin‟s Q the following 
year. The result on CEO compensation and accounting performance show a positive 
correlation, although statistically insignificant. In regressions using CPS, the results show 
no statistically significant association with either of the firm performance measures. 
Findings imply that Finnish CEOs enjoy a moderate and balanced compensation, and 
CEOs with relatively high compensation are able to increase firm performance, in respect 
to value. The findings on CPS are statistically insignificant, which suggests that the pay 
gap between executives has no association with firm performance. The ratio of CEO to 
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executive team member average compensation seems to have a linear relationship, with the 
CEO averaging 2.74 times the compensation of an executive. As the compensation 
variations for a company‟s CEO and executive seem to increase and decrease at a similar 
rate, CPS values experience little variation across the studied firms. This might be one of 
the reasons for the insignificant results on CPS and firm performance. 
The main limitations to this study are the possible human error in the collection of 
compensation data and the possible bias caused by the calculations for CPS. Due to some 
companies‟ executive teams employing less than five members or executive team 
compensation reported as a total, some adjustments were inevitable in order to calculate a 
CPS value relatively comparable with previous studies. 
These findings provide useful reference for future research on executive compensation. 
Although, executive compensation and firm performance is a widely studied area, the 
Nordic countries are not in the center of the research. CEO Pay Slice is a relatively new 
measure of executive compensation and CEO appreciation. For determining the 
importance and value of the measure, further research is recommended with variations in 
data and methodology. Including the cultural dimensions to assess the cross-country 
variations could prove valuable.  
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